Phishing and spear phishing are typical examples of masquerade attacks since trust is built up through impersonation for the attack to succeed. Given the prevalence of these attacks, considerable research has been conducted on these problems along multiple dimensions. We reexamine the existing research on phishing and spear phishing from the perspective of the unique needs of the security domain, which we call security challenges: real-time detection, active attacker, dataset quality and base-rate fallacy. We explain these challenges and then survey the existing phishing/spear phishing solutions in their light. This viewpoint consolidates the literature and illuminates several opportunities for improving existing solutions. We organize the existing literature based on detection techniques for different attack vectors (e.g., URLs, websites, emails) along with studies on user awareness. For detection techniques we examine properties of the dataset, feature extraction, detection algorithms used, and performance evaluation metrics. This work can help guide the development of more effective defenses for phishing, spear phishing and email masquerade attacks of the future, as well as provide a framework for a thorough evaluation and comparison.
swaying opinions (e.g., the case of stealing elections). The phrase malware delivery is self-explanatory.
Email continues to be one of the most convenient and popular vectors of choice for the above attacks. An email is usually embedded with a poisoned link to a fraudulent website set up to trick the victim. However, with the growing popularity of social networks, a new medium for spreading malicious links is also available in the form of instant messaging applications, chat services, etc.
The persistent popularity of phishing and spear phishing with attackers [1] , [2] , comes from the fact that they exploit the human element ("weakest link") [3] and do not require any actual intrusion into the system or network. Phishing/spear phishing attacks have been successfully used to bring wellprotected companies to their knees (e.g., the attack on RSA as described in [4] ) and estimates of losses from phishing alone run into several hundred million dollars in the U.S. In addition to the monetary loss, there is also a loss of time, productivity, and damage to reputation. Apart from, stealing sensitive information, email attachment and Web links in the emails are the most common way of spreading malware, for example, 9 out of 10 phishing emails detected in Verizon network on March 2016 carried ransomware [5] . Previous phishing studies have found that phishing is "far more successful than commonly thought" and it is the main mechanism for manual account hijacking [1] , [6] .
Despite more than a decade of research on phishing, it still continues to be a serious problem. There could be several reasons for this: the problem itself may be intractable, the technical approaches so far may have missed important parameters of the problem, phishing exploits the human as the weakest link so purely technical approaches may not be sufficient, or some combination of these. To expose the reasons for the continued success of phishing, we survey the detection literature and user studies on phishing and spear phishing.
We found that researchers have tackled phishing/spear phishing in many papers, and there are several surveys of these attempts. However, we discovered that there are certain methodological issues with phishing detection research. For example, we notice:
• The use of balanced datasets and inappropriate metrics • Unreported training and testing times • Lack of generalization studies • Also in user studies, we find the multiple comparison issue Many surveys have missed quite a few of these issues, e.g., the dataset diversity issue is never mentioned. Challenges such as base-rate fallacy, active attacker and generalization studies, which we collectively call "security challenges" are rarely mentioned, let alone emphasized. We identify the required set of challenges in cybersecurity based on those outlined in [2] , [7] .
Our goal is to reinvigorate research on these problems and reorient it towards solving the urgent, practical needs of the security domain [2] . Hence, we reexamine the previous literature on phishing and spear phishing from the viewpoint of the unique needs of the security domain, which we elaborate upon in Section IV, to determine the appropriateness of the proposed solutions. To our knowledge, a comprehensive evaluation of the appropriateness of the previous research on phishing and spear phishing from the security perspective has not been done before. A better understanding of the previous studies in this light will foster research on effective and practical defenses for these problems. Such a perspective will also provide a framework for a thorough evaluation of current and future solutions. User studies are also important for stopping the phishing attacks since attackers try to elude computer users. No matter how good the detection system works, end users should be prepared for the different types of attacks. So, we also review the phishing user studies in addition to the detection techniques. We observed that there are quite a few existing surveys on phishing emails, significantly fewer on phishing websites and URLs (Uniform Resource Locators), and none on user studies. However, we did not find any survey on phishing or spear phishing that emphasized the unique needs of the security domain and examined the research from this perspective. Our contributions are as follows:
• We adapt the security challenges in cybersecurity [2] , [7] to the field of detecting phishing URLs, websites, emails and user studies. • We collect and review a comprehensive list of literature on phishing and spear phishing detection systems as well as user studies. • We conduct a systematic review of the phishing detection research with a focus on: the features extracted, detection methods used, properties of the evaluation dataset (source, size, class ratio, diversity, recency), evaluation metrics for studying system performance. • We investigate the diversity of several popular URL, website and email datasets. • We select and discuss well-cited literature based on their contributions from the perspective of the security challenges addressed by the authors. • We summarize the best practices observed in the studied phishing detection literature. Paper Organization: Section II describes our search for relevant literature, which is important for the reader to understand the exact contours of our systematization. Then, we discuss essential background (Section III) and security challenges (Section IV). Common notations for a thorough review of detection research and user studies are in Section V. We investigate phishing detection research in Sections VI-VIII. Opportunities for future work are discussed in Section IX. We analyze user studies in Section X, and compare our work with related work in Section XI. Section XII concludes the paper.
II. SYSTEMATIC LITERATURE COLLECTION
We followed a systematic methodology to search the relevant research papers and surveys, which address phishing and spear phishing attacks. According to DBLP (Digital Bibliography & Library Project), the first phishing papers appeared in 2004, 1 and there are 732 papers from 2004-2017. 2 For comparison, a publication search with keyword 'spam' on DBLP yields 2,213 papers (the query, 'spam$', exact word match for spam, yielded 1,785 papers), but this is an estimate, since it includes opinion/review spam papers and also more than 100 matches with author last name "Spampinato."
To gather the research papers for this study, at first we used the queries "phish URL, phish link, phish site, phish Web, phish email/e-mail" independently on four databases: DBLP, ACM Digital Library, IEEE Xplore, and Google Scholar (allintitle query). We also found many papers that study phishing as part of malicious and malware centric behavior. Therefore, we added the following additional queries (without quotes) -"malware URL, malicious URL, malware link, malicious link, malware site, malicious site, malware email/e-mail, malicious email/e-mail." However, we only consider research specific to phishing attack vectors -URL, email and websites. Papers which propose mainly malware detection techniques are beyond the scope of this survey. To search for relevant literature on spear phishing, we used the queries "spear phishing" (this query also covers spear phishing) and "spearphishing." The queries "spear phish" and "spearphish" did not yield any additional results. Later, we realized that authors sometimes just use "phishing detection" or "phishing attack," or some other variation. So we expanded our search using "phish" and "phishing" to the above databases.
For this paper, we mainly focus on research published between the years 2010-2017. We cover papers appearing up to March 2018, and any pre-2010 paper that is highly cited or appeared in a major security venue. 3 We also cover general phishing surveys appearing up to 2018. Our search gave us over 734 papers on phishing detection and user studies, which we then reduced using the conference/journal CORE rankings of B or higher to approximately 300 papers. 4 Figure 1 shows the distribution of papers covered based on the publication year and type: URL detection, website detection, email detection and user studies (papers published between 2010-2017). It shows a significant increase in attention to the user studies (a 20% increase from 2014 to 2016) compared to other areas. This could be due to the increasing use of spear phishing attacks. It is also clear that more papers focused on phishing URL detection during [2014] [2015] [2016] . Surprisingly, phishing email detection seems to be falling out of favor. Note that if an email detection paper also used URL Fig. 1 . The number of papers that we cover in this survey for each year based on their type (from 2010 to 2017). Numbers inside the bars denote the count of phishing URL, website, email and user study papers in each year. The numbers in front of each bar is the total count of papers in that year.
features for detection (70% of email detection papers do this), we classify it as an email paper for this figure, and similarly if a phishing website detection paper used URL features (64%), then we classify it as a website paper.
During our search, we also found a number of surveys on various aspects of phishing. Before we begin, we should clarify that it is very difficult to directly compare the proposed systems in literature, since most of them used different datasets for evaluation. Even if the same sources were used, e.g., Phishtank and Alexa, we still cannot compare them directly because these datasets are updated regularly. The situation is a little different for emails since several research papers use the same phishing email datasets, which are publicly available. However, the legitimate datasets used are different because researchers collect their own data or use emails from some private sources. We could compare the detection rate for the phishing email datasets used, but it would not be an accurate comparison since the training is done using both datasets.
III. BACKGROUND

A. Phishing and Spear Phishing
As reported by many surveys, the first phishing attack is supposed to have occurred in 1995 on America Online (AOL). Phishing has been one of the preferred methods used by attackers to lure unsuspecting victims. There is ample literature on the steps involved in a phishing attack (see [8] , [9] for example). As suggested in [8] , the phishing process can be divided into five steps: reconnaissance, weaponization, distribution, exploitation, exfiltration. It starts with the attacker, disguised as a legitimate entity (reconnaissance). Then they host a website similar to the target (weaponization) and send an attack vector (usually an email) to the victim (distribution). The attackers may also spread such links using social networking sites, instant messaging applications, etc. The attackers use innovative methods to exploit the weakness of humans to make them think the fraudulent websites are legitimate (exploitation), e.g., using URLs which are similar to the original one (paypa1.com instead of paypal.com). In the last step, attackers collect the sensitive information exposed by victims (exfiltration). For spear phishing, we refer the reader to [10] .
Estimates of the economic damage caused by phishing can be found in [11] , and the growth or prevalence of phishing can be seen from reports by Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) [12] . Besides these papers, noteworthy is a study of phishing networks by "spidering" chat rooms across major Internet Relay Chat (IRC) servers [13] and a study of the economics on phishing from the perspective of all phishers treated as a group [14] . Authors argue that the average payoff for a phisher is likely to be small under certain assumptions. This result does not tell us about the distribution, which could be highly skewed with a high median for example. Also, if the payoff is low for some phishers, many of them may be discouraged and move to greener pastures until the situation "improves" for the rest, which will attract more phishers. Thus, the cycle repeats.
B. Modus Operandi of Phishing
Several studies examined aspects of how phishers create their attacks and how they deceive their victims [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] . In [15] , researchers analyzed a proprietary dataset and found that phishing domain names have a different length distribution from legitimate domains and a different character frequency distribution from that of standard English text. Cova et al. [16] and McCalley et al. [17] analyzed phishing kits, which are packages that contain easy-to-deploy, complete phishing websites downloaded from the Internet. They found in these kits examples of obfuscation and also backdoors, which send the collected information to a third party. Thus, they were being used to fool gullible users as well as naïve phishers. More recently, Han et al. [18] created a honeypot to attract phishers so that they could analyze live phishing kits. They have several interesting results on the timespan and other characteristics of the phishing life cycle from deployment to blacklisting.
In [19] , authors have made a detailed study of vulnerabilities exploited and technical approaches in phishing attacks.
C. Variations on Phishing
Because it exploits the weakest link in the security chain, i.e., humans [3] , phishing is now moving to social networks, and also SMS/text messages (smishing). 5 Other variants of phishing include vishing (voice-based phishing) and QRishing (phishing using QR codes). However, there are only a handful of papers on these topics, as shown in [1] , [19] .
D. Phishing Detection
Blacklists are a commonly used method to thwart phishing attacks [20] . The popular blacklists like PhishTank are created using crowd-sourcing but have two shortcomings -i. manual maintenance, ii. newer phishing attacks launched for short time windows may remain undetected [21] , [22] . Thus, to overcome these issues, data science methods have gained popularity with researchers to detect phishing websites and emails. They use dataset of legitimate and phishing URLs/emails to train different classification models [8] . Then, these models can be used to either build and update a blacklist or detect phishing URLs/emails in real-time while Internet users open a website or email. Figure 2 illustrates the stages of a machine learning based phishing detection system. It starts with one or more datasets and extracts features from different components of website/email (e.g., URL, HTML, email header, etc.). In the next step, the extracted features are fed to the learning algorithms to extract the patterns/rules for distinguishing legitimate email/URLs from phishing. In the fourth step, the effectiveness of the model will be evaluated using different metrics. Finally, the results will be interpreted and the best models and features will be determined, with insights on what worked best or worst. We review the different techniques proposed/used by researchers in more details in Sections VI-VIII.
E. Human Vulnerability
Machine learning techniques are not 100% accurate. Moreover, models trained on historical data may fail to identify newer attack types. Therefore, the user also becomes an important element in the detection cycle. Understanding the users' behavior as well as training them to properly detect attack vectors play an important role in the prevention of phishing attacks.
There are some vulnerabilities in human cognition which help attackers in deceiving people. Researchers in [23] categorized emails based on their intention into four groups: (1) Risk or Loss (2) Benefit or Gain (3) Account Information and (4) Information Only. The first category uses the sense of urgency and panic to make people click on a link and expose their sensitive information. The second group uses people's excitement about receiving a big prize to lure them. The last two groups are not as pressing as the first two which make 5 https://www.wandera.com/mobile-security/phishing/mobile-phishingattacks/ them look more legitimate for non-expert users. A study of phishing emails sent to about 6 million people, conducted by KnowBe4 [24] , revealed that people fall for attacks belonging to groups 1 and 2 more frequently than the other types. Their results showed that the click rate is higher for the emails which promise money or threaten loss of money.
In this paper, we also cover the user studies to have a thorough overview of the different aspects of the detection cycle. Before reexamining the phishing detection literature and user studies from the security viewpoint, we examine the specific needs of the security domain, which we call security challenges.
IV. SECURITY CHALLENGES
The security domain imposes a number of challenges on data science methods that are typically used to detect phishing and spear phishing attacks [2] , [7] . In [2] , the following challenges were identified. 1) Active Attacker: In the security domain, there is an adversary who is constantly trying to learn the defensive methods being employed and working to defeat them. For this reason, defenders need to design methods that can detect new attacks (zero-day attacks) or variations of existing attacks, not just the ones seen in the past. Supervised machine learning methods perform well if the test data has the same/similar distribution as the training data, but this "stationarity" assumption may not hold in practice because of active attackers (adversarial setting), so retraining of the model or online learning methods are required. 2) Base-Rate Fallacy: The incidence of an attack, i.e., the base-rate, has a bearing on the likelihood that something classified as an attack is actually an attack. In a big company like Chevron, the number of legitimate emails sent and received is in the millions per day and the attacks may only be a few 10s to 100s [25] . For example, if the incidence of an attack is 10% and a classifier is 90% accurate, then the probability that a scenario classified as an attack is actually an attack is only 50%. The ratio between positive and negative samples used for system evaluation and the use of appropriate metrics are a major concern for security researchers. 3) Time Scale of Attacks: An attack can be over very quickly, so we may need real-time prevention/detection. In the case of phishing detection, the volume of data that has to be processed, e.g., emails, necessitates efficient and fast methods. 4) Dataset Issues: There are four dataset issues: availability, diversity, recency, and quality. Because companies are worried about the damage to their reputation [25] , there is a reluctance to share attacks. Hence researchers have limited data sources available, which also has an adverse effect on diversity and quality of datasets. By quality, we mean how well the dataset represents the real scenario. For example, if the real scenario is extremely imbalanced as for spear phishing emails, then the test dataset should reflect this. Recency of datasets also plays an important role in system evaluation. Other challenges mentioned in [2] include: asymmetrical and user-dependent costs of misclassification (e.g., misclassifying phishing emails is less costly than misclassifying legitimate emails for an expert, but for a beginner the opposite may be true), 6 imbalanced datasets (this is related to the base-rate fallacy), the pernicious effects of false alarms, the semantic gap (the gap between the classifier's decision and the explanation for that decision; many machine learning methods provide no human-readable explanation of their decision), and the opportunity for attackers to poison publicly-available datasets.
In [7] , the researchers identified the following challenges that are specific to applying machine learning for intrusion detection: outlier detection setting, the high cost of misclassification, semantic gap, diversity of network traffic, and difficulties with evaluation. Difficulties with evaluation were further elaborated upon as data difficulties, mind the gap, and adversarial setting. Figure 2 shows the relevant and critical challenges at each step of phishing detection.
In this paper, we focus on the following challenges, which are the most important in the phishing context: adversarial setting, fast and efficient detection, dataset issues, base-rate fallacy, and evaluation metrics. The semantic gap is also an important issue, but there has been hardly any progress in this dimension. The pernicious effect of false alarms, i.e., flagging a legitimate email as phishing, implies that the false alarm rate should be kept low, but the threshold is subjective and hence hard to treat objectively in scientific research. Similar observations hold for user-dependent misclassification cost.
V. COMMON NOTATIONS AND ORGANIZATION
In reviewing the phishing detection schemes, we focus on the following key attributes, which are essential for robust detection.
A. Key Attributes for Phishing Detection
• Nature and Source of Data: Information about the nature and composition of the data, i.e., malware, phishing, or spam. In addition to the sources of the dataset and their availability, we report datasets' sizes, quality, diversity, and recency. This stems directly from the dataset concerns. • Feature Extraction: Description of the types of features extracted from the datasets for detection and analysis of URLs, websites, or emails along with any feature selection techniques like information gain. Feature extraction has implications for speed, efficiency, and robustness. To have a better understanding of the feature's effect on detection systems, we discuss two important properties of the features: feature size and processing time. Feature size is important since it can affect the detection time of systems. For example, using term frequency as a feature increases the number of features dramatically, which may slow down some classifiers (and require more resources).
Processing time can affect the response time of the detection system. If generating a feature takes a long time it can delay the system's response. • Classification Methods: This includes the type of detection technique (e.g., machine learning, rule/pattern based, or heuristic) used. We also include fine-grained attributes such as supervised or unsupervised, running times for training and testing the system, specifications of the architecture used and whether system retraining frequency was specified. These attributes contribute to the speed and efficiency of the proposed system. • Experimental Setup/Methodology: This is related to adversarial issues and replicability of the work. It includes system evaluation details, e.g., testing it in a real-time setting, whether the system was tested across various domains (e.g., if a model trained on phishing links was also tested on spam, etc.), and how was ground truth obtained. Moreover, if the proposed system was evaluated for robustness, we report the parameters or metrics used for system evaluation, and whether the experiment was realistic.
B. Common Notations for Detection Sections
We briefly explain the common notations and terminologies that we will be using throughout the paper in this section.
Features Tables: For each feature, we report two criteria: Feature Size (FS) and Processing Time (PT). These criteria were selected keeping in mind the goals and security challenges mentioned in Sections I and IV, respectively. We consider feature sizes less than 10 as Small, between 10 to 100 as Medium, and more than 100 as Large. For PT, we group the processing times of less than 100 milliseconds as short, between 100 milliseconds and 1 second as moderate, and more than 1 second as high.
A number of phishing website and email detection techniques use URL features along with other host/networking features. Therefore, we highlight the papers that use URL features for phishing website detection, e.g., in Table A10 , under the name 'uW.' Papers that study URL features extracted from phishing emails are tagged with 'uE'.
Dataset Sources Tables: If researchers used private or 'unnamed' sources, these are listed under 'Miscellaneous (pvt.)' and for sparsely used public sources, we include them under 'Miscellaneous (pub.)'. We list data collected by the authors under 'Author (pvt.)'. Some papers do not reveal dataset source(s) -we include these papers under 'N/A' (Not Available).
Dataset Sizes Tables: In the dataset sizes tables, the number '100s' denotes that the total dataset size (training and testing combined) used for evaluation is between 100-999. Similarly, 1000s denotes dataset sizes in the range 1000-9999, etc.
Metrics Tables: The notations in all metrics tables (e.g., Table VII ) are as follows: CMx -Confusion Matrix (a matrix with the number of true positives (TP), true negatives (TN), false positives (FP) and false negatives (FN)); Acc -Accuracy (Equation (1)), PRF -Precision, Recall, and F 1 -Score (Equations (2), (3), and (4)), ErR -Error Rate (1−accuracy), AUC -Area Under an ROC Curve (the area under the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve is a measure of system accuracy). There are also some other metrics which are more appropriate for imbalanced datasets, e.g., Geometric Mean (G-Mean), Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC), and Balanced Accuracy [26] . Equations (5), (6) and (7) are the formulas for these metrics. P and N are the size of positive and negative classes, respectively.
Balanced Accuracy = TP P + TN N .
Dataset Diversity: We analyze the diversity of content found in websites and email bodies by converting them into vector representation using Term Frequency-Inverse Document Frequency (TFIDF), a term weighting scheme that uses term frequency in a document and log of the inverse popularity of the term in the collection [27] . This is defined by Equation (8) below, where n t,d is the number of times term t appears in a document d, N d is the total number of terms in d, D is the total number of documents, and d t is the number of documents with the term t in it.
TFIDF tries to capture the importance of a word in a document. Words that appear in several documents are devalued since they are worse at distinguishing between the documents. Before converting the content to TFIDF vectors, we remove the uninformative and commonly used words such as the, a, and in (called stopwords). We use the stopwords list provided in Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK). Then we use cosine similarity, Equation (9) , to measure the similarity between the vectors. Cosine similarity is the cosine of the angle between the two vectors.
Organization of Each Detection Section: We start our discussion by showing the structure of a URL/website/email and the features that can be extracted from it. We then describe the methods used for phishing URL/website/email detection, the datasets employed, and the metrics studied in previous research. We close the section with research that has addressed at least a few of the key security challenges and some opportunities for future research.
We now organize and assess the phishing detection techniques and user studies from the standpoint of the above security challenges. Many researchers have focused on URL analysis as one way (sometimes the only way) of detecting phishing websites. We reexamine this line of research first.
VI. PHISHING URL DETECTION
Based on the above key attributes (Section V-A), we reexamine 61 relevant research papers on phishing URL detection.
A. URL Structure
A URL is defined as a reference or an address to a resource on the Internet. In Figure 3 , we demonstrate the structure of a typical URL. 7 1) Scheme: This identifies the protocol to be used to access the resource on the Internet. Common protocols are HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP) and Secure HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTPS). 2) Host: The hostname or domain name refers to the human-readable name for the address at which the resource can be accessed using the URL. In the above example, www.example.com acts as the hostname. 3) Port: The port number follows the hostname or the Internet Protocol (IP) address. The port indicates the type of communication between the client (asking for resource access) and the server (granting resource access). Here, the port number 1030 acts as the TCP port. 4) Path: This indicates the path to the exact location of the resource on the host. In the above example, the resource resides at the location '/software/index.html/ '. 5) Query: The query string if provided follows the path component and provides a string of information with a specific purpose. In the above example, the query string 'q=user' will prompt the server to access the user page. The symbol '?' separates the path and the query.
B. Features
A large number of features can be extracted from the URL like the presence of certain tokens or words, token length, token frequency, count of special symbols, as well as the presence of any meta-symbols (e.g., @ symbol which is interpreted in a special way by the browser). A URL can be treated as a 7 "Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI): Generic Syntax", http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2396.txt. string of characters allowing the extraction of lexical features like edit distance, frequency of character n-grams, etc.
We group the different features used in phishing URL detection literature into four major classes: (i) Lexical properties, (ii) Obfuscation (use of encoding in URL, use of '&', '%20' instead of space, etc.) and Shortened URL properties (use of goo.gl, bit.ly, tinyurl services for shortening and obfuscating long malicious links [30] ), (iii) Hostname and Domain Name System (DNS) based properties, and (iv) IP address and WHOIS properties (WHOIS server details, e.g., the date of registration, update, and expiration). The aforementioned taxonomy has been developed after careful consideration of previous literature including related surveys, e.g., [31] , [32] . Table I lists URL feature classes along with feature size and processing time required for each feature. A majority of the lexical features -target word frequency, frequency of alphanumeric characters, character n-grams, bag-of-words, etc., -need higher processing time. Similarly, we note that, for obfuscation based properties, the processing time ranges from short to moderate. IP address based features -the presence of encoding in IP, is the IP blacklisted or whitelisted, etc., -have short to moderate feature sizes and processing times. Retrieving WHOIS based information (e.g., creation, update and expiration dates, WHOIS registration details) involves querying WHOIS servers, which increases the feature processing time. Figure 4 shows the distribution of URL feature classes based on their usage across the three dimensions of phishing detection -URL (U), website content (W) and email content (E). According to Figure 4 , the most popular feature types used across all dimensions are: obfuscation-based, lexical-based and DNS-based properties. Table A10 in the Appendix gives a more detailed breakdown of the literature based on types of features extracted. We now consider the detection methods that have been used in the phishing URL detection literature.
C. Detection Methods
Researchers have proposed a variety of detection methods for phishing URL detection. These methods vary from blacklist/whitelist based techniques to machine learning based algorithms.
We show the major classes of machine learning algorithms used in phishing URL detection literature in Figure 5 . The papers are categorized based on the type of learning method -supervised (popular techniques are Decision Tree, Random Forest, Support Vector Machines, Naïve Bayes, and Logistic Regression), Unsupervised (K-Means Clustering), Online learners (Confidence Weighted, Adaptive Regularization of Weights, etc.). A few papers employ rarely-used methods, e.g., association rule mining and Markov models. Clearly, a majority of the proposed systems are supervised. Other promising learning approaches, such as rule-based, unsupervised, and semi-supervised approaches, remain largely unexplored. Of the supervised methods, only one paper [33] used deep learning in the form of Recurrent Neural Networks. Next, we discuss the properties of the dataset that play an important role in building a robust detection system.
D. Dataset Properties
Critical properties of a dataset include: the source(s) of a dataset, diversity or representativeness, data size, class distribution and recency. In this section, we review the literature based on these properties.
1) Dataset Sources and Availability: In Tables II-IV, we categorize papers based on the combination of benign and malicious data sources (phishing, spam, and malware, respectively) along with their availability (public, private, deprecated). Figures 6 and 7 show data sources and the percentage of surveyed literature using each source. The most popular sources for URL data are: (a) Legitimate: DMOZ (now deprecated), Alexa.com, Yahoo URL generator (deprecated) and (b) Phishing: PhishTank, APWG and OpenPhish. Sources like Alexa.com list domain names only, which can artificially inflate the results, since such legitimate domains can be easily distinguished from the complete URLs found in phishing data sources. A more thorough data collection involves crawling the top sites from Alexa and subsequent links from these sites. During our review, we found that many papers that use Alexa fail to mention any preprocessing that addresses this issue. Multiple research papers have also used DMOZ and Yahoo URL generator as legitimate sources, which are currently deprecated. In such a situation, system retraining becomes important and comparing results becomes harder. PhishTank is a crowdsourced blacklist where controlling the quality of the URLs 8 is critical. Twitter is also a common platform for sharing malicious URLs. We include spam and malware URL data sources both in URL and website sections, primarily because a large number of papers, e.g., [34] [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] , use a mix of phishing, malware, and spam data, collectively termed as "malicious." We observe little variation in the dataset sources used for evaluation in the literature, with a few exceptions. Researchers tend to use publicly available sources for building their evaluation datasets.
2) Dataset Size and Class Ratio: We expect that an Internet user will generally encounter a phishing URL significantly less frequently than a benign one. Thus, researchers should evaluate their classifiers with different and imbalanced class ratios. We report the count of phishing URL detection papers using various combinations of data sizes in Table V . We compare the sizes of only the phishing datasets with the legitimate, since it is the main focus of this paper. Table V shows that a majority of the papers studied report evaluation results only on balanced datasets, as most papers appear on or close to the diagonal in the table. Also, only a small subset (approx. 23%) of the surveyed papers has used relatively large (comprising ≥ 100,000s URLs) URL datasets.
Researchers in [29] , [40] , [41] , [78] considered both imbalanced and balanced scenarios in their evaluations. In [22] , [29] , [39] , [40] , researchers evaluated their classifiers on varying ratios (ratios considered were 2:1, 3:2, 8:1, etc.) of benign to malicious URLs, whereas in [28] , [45] , [49] , [66] , [76] , [79] researchers evaluated their classifiers on highly imbalanced datasets (the benign dataset size is almost 50 times or more) but fixed ratios. Papers [35] , [47] , [49] , [55] , [68] report moderate benign-to-malicious data ratios (e.g., 2:1, 3:2, 5:1, etc.). Authors in [30] , [43] , [46] , [54] , [70] , [80] [81] [82] used slightly imbalanced, or almost balanced, 9 data. Systems in [43] , [59] , [72] used more malicious URLs than legitimate ones.
Table A7 (in the Appendix) provides a detailed distribution of the dataset sizes used in the literature according to their types (phishing, spam, and malware). Some research papers, e.g., [22] , [28] , [39] , [83] , and some others (Refer to Table A7 ), have used millions of URLs (both benign and malicious) for the evaluation of their systems. But these are usually static datasets, i.e., data collected over time and stored for usage. Some researchers go a step further -they deployed and tested their classifiers in a real-time environment [71] , [76] , [84] . Moreover, malicious links can be shared via chat sessions and Twitter feeds -therefore, including the papers that test such sources (under category Feed) is essential. Irrespective of size, the datasets may not be diverse. In the following subsection, we evaluate the diversity of some popular, publicly-available datasets.
3) Dataset Diversity: We collected phishing URLs (live at the time of collection) from three different sources PhishTank (22,018 URLs), APWG (9,757 URLs) and OpenPhish (5, 484 URLs) on Nov 2017. The legitimate URLs were collected using the list of top domains from Alexa as the seed for our crawler 10 to generate a more realistic dataset. To increase the diversity of the legitimate websites, we retrieved the top 40 websites from each category on Alexa 11 excluding the three categories: Adult, Regional, and World. We stopped the crawler after collecting 91,610 URLs.
Calculating the frequency of domains in each dataset ( Figure 8 ) revealed that the top 50 domains constitute 24%, 12.6% and 18% of URLs extracted from OpenPhish, PhishTank, and APWG respectively. From these percentages, PhishTank seems to be a more diverse dataset than the other two.
For the Alexa dataset, the top 50 domains comprise 75% of URLs. However, this can be mitigated by limiting the number of URLs crawled from each domain in the list. Thus, we changed our crawler's configuration to store at most 12 URLs for each domain. Following this modification, the percentage of URLs with the top 50 domains in Alexa dataset reduced to 2.3% (out of 21,788 total URLs). When we limit the number of URLs for each domain, the top N domains variable becomes a linear function of dataset size. Thus, limiting the number of URLs collected from each domain can help build a more diverse legitimate dataset.
In the above experiment, we studied all datasets independently. We did not compare the phishing and legitimate datasets with each other since this would go into the realm of developing detection techniques, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
The time period of datasets is also important since a classifier can overfit on some attributes common to instances from a specific time period. Such a classifier will fail miserably on newer kinds of attacks. So, we study the collection time periods of datasets in the next section.
4) Recency of Data Collection:
Recency of data collection is an important aspect of the evaluation datasets. Since attackers tend to launch their attacks for short time windows, malicious links can become dead quickly. So, URL datasets need to be collected close to attack launch time. We specify recency in Table VI . It shows the relative age of the dataset, which is n − m, where m is the year during which the URLs were collected from the respective sources by the researchers and n is the year in which the paper was published. Some researchers (e.g., [29] , [67] , [76] ) explicitly consider the active attacker and choose to train and retrain their systems on datasets collected across various time frames. This ensures better resiliency of the system to newer and probably more evolved attacks. In Table VI , we mark such papers in bold. However, a large fraction (approx. 55%) of the papers surveyed does not report the collection time of datasets.
We next describe the different evaluation metrics used in phishing URL detection papers.
E. Evaluation Metrics
The choice of metric(s) is very important for sound system evaluation. In Table VII , we report papers that use one (along the diagonal) or a combination of two types of metrics. Papers that report more (9 papers) than two metrics are discussed but are not counted in this table. However, 10 out of 61 papers do not report the evaluation metrics used.
Accuracy and Confusion Matrix are the most popular metrics. We group papers that use True Positive, False Positive, True Negative and False Negative values as metrics (both raw numbers as well as rates) into the Confusion Matrix (CMx) category. Next in popularity are: Precision (P), Recall (R), and F 1 -score (abbr. F, it is the harmonic mean of precision and recall) along with Error Rate (ErR). Some papers report additional metrics, e.g., Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) [49] , Area Under Curve (AUC) [35] , [43] , and classification costs [79] . A few papers consider combinations of three or more metrics: Acc, CMx, Other 12 in [79] , Acc, PRF, CMx in [68] , Acc, PRF, AUC in [33] , [35] , Acc, PRF, CMx, ErR in [87] and Acc, PRF, CMx, AUC in [50] , [51] . More details on metrics useds along with relevant citations are reported in Appendix Table A1 .
Another important facet to consider is the use of appropriate evaluation metrics when considering imbalanced datasets. Accuracy is not always the appropriate for multiple reasons: Base-rate fallacy in Section IV, imbalanced datasets, and asymmetric costs. Similar is the case for the error rate metric. In such a scenario, ROC, AUC, and confusion matrix values should be the preferred choice. Researchers should also use metrics specifically proposed for imbalanced experiments [26] , e.g., geometric mean, Matthews Correlation Coefficient (MCC), Balanced Accuracy, Balanced Detection Rate [88] , etc.
However, of the papers that use highly imbalanced URL datasets: [28] , [49] use error rate, [45] uses false positive and false negative rates, which is better, since one can calculate other metrics (if dataset size and distribution of classes is also reported), [66] uses malicious missing rate and detection rate, and [41] makes use of popular metrics: accuracy, precision, recall, F 1 -score and ROC. Thus, we observe mostly inappropriate imbalanced dataset metrics in the studied literature.
F. Selected Phishing URL Detection Papers
We now discuss phishing URL detection papers that addressed at least a few security challenges. The selection is based on the number of challenges (Section V-A) addressed.
Zhao and Hoi [79] proposed a scalable cost-sensitive active learning (CSOAL) framework that tackled multiple challenges listed in Section IV. To ensure efficiency and scalability of the proposed system in a Web-based environment, the authors used online active learners for building the detection model. The proposed system also handled phishing attacks launched with short time windows. Moreover, an online learning algorithm ensured faster system retraining. To deal with the issue of data availability, the system used a fraction of the provided dataset during training. The model was trained using only 0.5% of the data and was evaluated on a large (1M) and highly imbalanced (99 legitimate to 1 malicious) URL dataset. Thus, their method also considered class imbalance. The authors proposed two novel cost-sensitive measures -weighted cost and weighted sum of sensitivity and specificity for better system evaluation, but these were not compared to other metrics suitable for imbalanced data (see Section VI-E). Other experiments include system scalability and study of training and testing times. However, the authors did not address the active attacker issue.
In [35] , authors proposed a lightweight phishing detection system using lexical features for link analysis. Such a system ensures separation between the victim and the attacker; and a lightweight scheme ensures speed and scalability. The authors also study system performance by conducting "generalization experiments" across multiple evaluation datasets of varying ratios between benign and malicious classes in the dataset (ratios considered were 3:1, 1:1, and 1:3). Researchers argue that their work is secure against an active attacker, but do not perform any proactive experiments to validate this claim. However, the metrics used for evaluation of the proposed system are inappropriate for imbalanced datasets.
Blacklist dependent phishing URL detection techniques can be defeated by phishers by simply launching new websites after short windows of time. Ma et al. [43] , addressed this issue by proposing a URL classification technique that makes use of a wide variety of features: lexical, host-based, blacklistbased and WHOIS properties. Although the authors used a relatively small dataset, they addressed the data diversity and generalization issue by creating multiple datasets using different publicly available sources. Other important attributes that stand out are: feature selection and comparison, classifier comparison, and error analysis. However, the small and relatively balanced dataset is a serious limitation. Moreover, the active attacker issue was not considered directly.
Novel distance-based features for phishing URLs based on Kullback-Leibler divergence (described in [89] to measure the distance between distributions of normalized character frequencies in URLs and Standard English) and Kolmogorov-Smirnov distance (measured using the twosample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test statistic [90] calculated from the distribution of character frequencies of the URLs versus that of standard English.) were used in [21] , along with modifications of some old features to make them more robust, e.g., the ratio of URL domain length to URL length was used instead of just URL length. Phishing detection at URL level, along with fast data structures used by the researchers, ensures a fast and lightweight approach capable of handling attacks launched within short time windows. The authors used four different datasets collected from different real-world sources 13 for evaluation, thus ensuring a diverse set of URLs. They also performed experiments to explicitly verify dataset diversity along with a cross-dataset experiment (training on one dataset and testing on another). The system performance using five supervised models was evaluated using accuracy, false positive rate, and classifier training/testing times. However, the proposed system was not evaluated using imbalanced datasets. The authors did not comment on system retraining for handling newer attacks.
Lee and Kim [29] evaluated malicious URLs collected from Twitter, a popular platform for sharing poisoned links. The authors partially handled the active attacker challenge by proposing a system that can identify correlations among URL redirect chains. The authors trained and evaluated the proposed system on a large dataset of malicious tweets using multiple metrics: accuracy, AUC, false positive and negative rates. The system was also evaluated in a real-time environment using a sliding window to vary the span of the training data feed. The authors also studied feature importance using F 1 -scores. However, while classification time per URL is reported, the training time is not specified.
We conclude this section with lessons learned and best practices based on our review of the literature.
G. Lessons Learned and Best Practices
We observed a number of useful practices in the literature as well as possibilities for improving future research. Use of techniques capable of handling data availability issues while providing reliable performance [79] is a desirable practice. Also, the use of cost-sensitive metrics [29] , [79] , which take into account the class-imbalance issue, is an important criterion for evaluation. Generalization experiments, or crossdomain testing of systems, is another recommended way for verifying the performance of the model on various types of attacks. We observed generalization experiments in a few papers, e.g., [22] , [35] . While a number of papers evaluated on imbalanced datasets [35] , [41] , [45] , [79] , we did not find any paper with the appropriate metrics (suggested in [26] ) to measure performance.
Feature selection can make a system faster and robust. Popular techniques for feature selection include information gain, F 1 -scores, etc. Phishing URL detection papers that used information gain include [30] , [35] , [66] , whereas [29] , [60] used F 1 -scores to determine feature importance. Other papers that analyzed feature importance include [41] , [59] , [76] , [78] .
VII. PHISHING WEBSITE DETECTION
For phishing website detection, we review 67 papers based on the selection criteria in Section II. We begin with the structure of a website.
A. Website Structure
A website refers to a collection of formatted documents that can be rendered and viewed using a Web browser (e.g., Chrome, Firefox, Microsoft Edge). Websites consist of three elements: (1) URL pattern, (2) layout and (3) link structure. Figure 9 shows the structure and elements of a typical website.
As described in Section VI, each website needs an address (URL) for access. The syntax of a URL and its different components were described in Section VI. Besides coming up with a URL, the domain must be registered with the DNS. When a user inputs the URL into a browser, it needs the IP address of that website, which it gets from the DNS server, to send HTTP (or HTTPS) requests. Figure 9 shows the communications from the users' browser to the DNS server and the Web server.
After the HTTP request, the browser receives the HTML content of the website. The layout refers to the syntactic structure of the Web page, i.e., the distribution of HTML elements. Website designers generally use the same layout for Web pages with similar functionalities. Thus, users can easily identify the purpose of a Web page by looking at its design. This can be a good source of features for detecting similarity between the websites since phishing websites try to mimic well-known target websites. Cascading Style Sheets (CSS) and JavaScript are the most common ways of specifying the layout. CSS is used to describe the position and other appearance properties of objects in the websites. JavaScript enables the content of a Web page to dynamically change on the client side.
Each Web page usually links to other Web pages for easy navigation. These links may or may not be in the same domain as the original Web page (Section VI). Popular websites have lots of incoming links from other websites, whereas phishing websites do not, since they are short-lived. Web page rankings (e.g., PageRank) by search engines can be used to measure the importance of Web pages. These rankings are based on the page attributes including the link structure.
The following components of a website can be used as features to characterize it:
• Network: We discussed in the previous section the syntactic features that are directly extracted from the URL.
Here, we include other features, which are indirectly related to the URL (e.g., DNS information, domain registration, and Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) certificate attributes). • HTML Content: This includes features that are extracted from the HTML content of the website. Examples are: number of links, webpage content, tags, and number of hidden elements. • JavaScript: Although Javascript features can be viewed as HTML features, we put them in a separate group because of their dynamic nature. In the next section, we discuss the features used in the reviewed literature, with the above taxonomy. Table VIII shows the features used in the studied phishing website detection literature. 14 These features can improve detection performance. However, they also increase the training and classification times since most of them need moderate or high extraction and processing times. Feature size for most of the website features is small except for Term Frequency, which depends on the size of the vocabulary. We emphasize that training of models require large-scale feature extraction, but for some of the website features, this may not be possible. For example, retrieving the WHOIS information involves sending requests to a WHOIS server which may start rejecting requests due to a rate-limiting policy.
B. Feature Extraction and Analysis
There are several hard to evade website features -Visual similarity of websites is one such feature, because if a website is not visually similar to the target website, then the victim will not fall for it. Another example is login-form identity. The phisher can manipulate this feature by removing the login fields, but this would defeat the main purpose of a phishing attack, which is to steal credentials. In Table A11 under the Appendix, we list the features along with citations to the papers that use them.
In the next section, we discuss the different phishing detection methods that use the aforementioned features. Figure 10 shows the different methods used in the phishing website detection literature as well as the number of papers that use each method. Supervised techniques -Support Vector Machines (SVM), logistic regression, decision tree, and Naïve Bayes -are the most popular phishing website detection methods. Only five papers use unsupervised and rule-based methods. In contrast to phishing URL detection methods, we see that online learning and deep learning techniques are missing in phishing website detection. More detailed information about the detection methods used in each paper is mentioned in the Appendix (Table A5) .
C. Detection Methods
While supervised learning is the preferred choice, such algorithms need a sizable ground truth or labeled data for training. Hence, we next describe the different datasets used in the phishing website detection literature.
D. Dataset Properties
Although the detection method is an important part of a proposed system, datasets that authors use to train and test their models have a significant effect on the trustworthiness of their models.
1) Dataset Sources and Availability: Website detection techniques have used almost the same datasets as used in URL detection, thus also exhibiting the lack of diversity issue. Although the papers are about phishing website detection, occasionally they use Malware and Spam websites to test/train their methods. Such papers are grouped together in the Malicious group (spam dataset refers to URLs extracted from the body of spam emails). Tables IX and X list the papers that use phishing and malicious sources along with the legitimate ones. Papers in which researchers used their own data sources are mentioned under Author's column. If they reveal the details of their sources publicly, they are listed as Author's public, otherwise as Author's private. Sources and Availability Fig. 11 . Distribution of papers based on legitimate website source. Figures 11 and 12 show the distribution of phishing and legitimate sources respectively. They show similar trends as we saw before in phishing URL detection ( Figures 6 and 7) . For the phishing dataset, 73% of the studies used PhishTank as their source of data and 9% used Millersmiles and 6% used APWG. For legitimate datasets, the sources are more diverse than phishing ones. Alexa (28%) is the most widely used dataset, but DMOZ (12%) and Yahoo Directory (20%) are also used in several studies (unfortunately, they are now deprecated).
2) Dataset Size and Class Ratio: Table XI shows the categorized sizes of the legitimate, phishing, or malicious website datasets used by each reviewed phishing website detection paper. We observe that more than 60% of the research papers report experiments on balanced datasets (red cells along the diagonal line of Table XI ). These systems do not consider the base-rate fallacy in their evaluation, hence their methods may perform quite differently in the real world. Also, only about one-third of the reviewed papers used at least 10,000 legitimate, phishing and/or malicious websites for evaluation. The rest suffer from the small dataset concern (eight papers do not mention their dataset sizes). More details on the sizes of datasets used by each paper can be found in the Appendix (Table A8) .
3) Dataset Diversity: As in the URL section, we analyze the diversity of PhishTank, OpenPhish, APWG, and Alexa, since these are also the most widely used sources for websites. However, instead of checking the diversity of URLs, we analyze the diversity found in the websites' content. We extracted all the text from the HTML body using the Python library called Beautiful Soup 15 to compare the websites' content. We also added a filter to remove all stopwords. Another preprocessing step is the removal of all the dead and non-English links. Then we converted them into vectors using the TFIDF representation. After converting each website into a vector, we use Cosine Similarity to measure the similarity between all pairs of websites.
After preprocessing, we ended up with 5,751, 1,665, 1861 and 63,670 URLs for PhishTank, OpenPhish, APWG, and Alexa, respectively. Table XII shows the percentage of website pairs with a specific range of similarities. For example, column "0-10" shows the fraction of website pairs in each dataset that has cosine similarity values in the range of 0% to 10%. The results showed that all four datasets except APWG are diverse from a website content point of view (1.3% of websites had more than 50% similarity for PhishTank and Alexa, and 6.2% for OpenPhish, compared to 21.6% for APWG). Table XIII describes the recency of the dataset collection time with respect to the paper's publication date. Unfortunately, only a few papers mentioned the time period during which their datasets were collected (25 out of 67). The importance of features may change over time, some features which were not important during the past year may now be useful, or the other way around. The use of newer data for evaluation also captures the capacity of a system to detect the latest attacks. Among the papers that mentioned the recency, a majority of the work is published less than a year after data collection. There are only a handful of research methods that propose real-time website-based detection systems [116] , [127] , [146] . Feature extraction time is a major obstacle for real-time website-based detection systems since they must extract the content from the website.
4) Recency of Data Collection:
E. Evaluation Metrics
As mentioned in Section VI-E, evaluation metrics should be chosen carefully when the dataset is imbalanced. We only found two papers that use a metric specifically suited to imbalanced datasets (MCC) [134] , [137] ; the rest reported commonly used metrics, which are more suitable for balanced datasets. Among these two papers, only [134] actually used an imbalanced dataset. Table XIV lists the metrics used for evaluating proposed methods in the literature. It only includes the papers that used up to two metrics (seven of 67 papers do not mention metrics). A total of 17 papers use a combination of more than two metrics for evaluation. For the complete list of papers and their metrics refer to Table A2 in the Appendix.
As shown in Table XIV , Confusion Matrix is the most used metric in the literature. The Error Rate and PRF (Precision, Recall and F 1 -score) are also popular among researchers, even though they are not appropriate metrics, when the dataset is imbalanced since they depend upon which class is considered positive. Among the reported metrics, AUC and Confusion Matrix (we can calculate all other metrics from the matrix) are better choices. Of the papers that use an imbalanced dataset, several did not use the appropriate metrics [91] , [102] , [116] , [121] , [123] , [134] , [146] , [154] . The following nine reported the Confusion Matrix [86] , [91] , [92] , [117] , [119] , [120] , [128] , [130] , [153] . One reported AUC [102] , and three reported both AUC and Confusion Matrix [96] , [105] , [111] .
F. Selected Phishing Website Detection Literature
Next, we present a detailed analysis of the reviewed literature that addressed one or more of the challenges described in Section IV.
Using imbalanced dataset is important because of the baserate fallacy challenge. While many papers [77] , [96] , [100] , [119] , [128] , [153] used imbalanced datasets, papers [94] , [127] addressed this issue differently. Researchers in [94] evaluated their algorithm by changing the ratio of maliciousto-benign examples (1:2, 1:5, 1:10, 1:15 and 1:20). The results show that both precision (97.6% to 94.2%) and recall (96.6% to 81.6%) decrease with an increase in the number of legitimate websites i.e., performance drops with increase in degree of imbalance. The malicious links in the dataset were collected only from spam emails, thus making it less diverse. They also did not mention the time period of the dataset they collected to train and test their method. Researchers in [127] also observed similar results by changing the non-spam to spam ratios (1:1, 1:4, and 1:10). A robust detection system should be able to thwart zero-day attacks (an attack that occurs on the same day a vulnerability is discovered) -thus, testing a system in a real-time environment is indispensable. The authors in [127] proposed 'Monarch' as a live phishing website detection system that uses a Logistic Regression classifier trained offline using blacklists and annotation schemes -the ground truth. The system's training URLs were aggregated from two streams: links in emails from a mail service provider as well as shared on Twitter. These two sources capture a widely different set of features in terms of lexical properties of URLs, hosting infrastructure, and page content (HTML and links). The training setup was done using varying ratios (1:1, 1:4, 1:10) of non-spam to spam (links caught using spam traps and/or blacklists were marked as spam, rest were labeled as non-spam). The system was tested in real-time using links extracted from the same two sources. The system was tested on 15 million URLs/day with classifier retraining every 4 days. However, the authors do not clearly discuss the ratio of spam and non-spam in their testing data stream. They note the deficiencies in their ground truth databut do not provide any ideas for improvement.
The active attacker poses a critical threat to phishing website detection systems. The framework proposed in [153] analyzed the possible interaction between attacker (evasion) and defender (counter-evasion). They demonstrated that an active attacker can evade machine learning based detection models (J48 classifier trained on 124 application/network-layer features) by manipulating the features of the malicious website. Their results validated that the proposed active method can increase the false negative rate to 89.1% by only changing 5% of features on average. They also showed that proactive training can reduce the success rate of the attacker. The authors also claimed that their method can make the decision for a given website after a few seconds but they did not report the classification time specifically.
Periodic system retraining is another way to identify newer types of attacks (active attacker challenge). Researchers in [92] used a model trained (with daily retraining) on Google's phishing blacklist to update the blacklist automatically. The authors addressed multiple goals in their paper, decreasing false positives while increasing recall, handling noise in training data (inaccurate labels), and decreasing the detection latency (to smoothly process millions of Web pages every day). They achieved the low latency goal by creating a pipeline system which tries to drop obvious non-phishing websites during the early stages. Their pipeline starts with extracting lightweight URL features followed by the content and hosting features. They use a novel machine learning algorithm similar to Random Forest and online learning algorithms for their system. Their model achieved 90% precision with only 0.1% false positive rate on a testing data of 75 million URLs collected over two weeks. However, the authors do not share details about the steps they took to overcome the dataset's noise.
Marchal et al. [96] addressed three security challenges in their method: the base-rate fallacy, lack of data availability, and active attackers. They proposed a phishing detection system that uses a relatively small training data (1036 phishing and 4531 legitimate) and tested on 101,553 websites (100,000 legitimate and 1553 phishing). The system uses features that cannot be fully manipulated by the attacker (reinforcement against active attackers) divided into four categories based on whether the attacker has full or partial control on the feature. For example, distribution of the terms in external links of a phishing website is completely out of the control of the attacker. Their method had a 99% AUC and less than 1% false positive rate using more than 200 features. They further grouped the features into five different categories (URL, term usage, starting and landing main level domain, registered domain name usage, and webpage content) and tested the effectiveness of each of them separately. Based on their results, URL features contributed the most (0.88 F 1 -score) compared to others. Additionally, their method is language independent and was tested on a dataset of six different languages (German, English, French, Portuguese, Italian, and Spanish) to show that the performance is similar for websites with different languages. However, they did not report the training and detection times of their system.
Applying machine learning techniques on extracted features from different sections of the website (URLs, HTML content, domains, etc.) is not enough to distinguish legitimate websites from their phishing counterparts. Using the user's interactions with websites, SpiderWeb [154] builds a graph from the redirect chain of the websites and distinguishes legitimate and malicious websites by defining a threshold. Since the redirect chains are collected from a diverse set of web users, the attacker needs to make the redirect chain of the malicious website similar to legitimate websites to evade detection. This can only be done by exposing the malicious website to a larger audience which increases the chance of getting caught. The main limitation of this work lies in the complexity of redirection chains -it requires a minimum number of different redirect chains (visits from different users) that lead to the same website to make a decision. They did an experiment with 10,914 users and found that their system detected the phishing websites after 723 users got compromised (93% successfully blocked).
Among all the systems reviewed here, none addressed all of the security challenges. The closest system [96] addressed three out of all the challenges mentioned in Section IV. A more thorough system is required to fill this gap. As a starting point for a better system, we should extract the best practices from existing works. Before moving to phishing email detection techniques, we summarize the lessons learned and best practices of phishing website detection techniques based on our review of the literature.
G. Lessons Learned and Best Practices
Among the systems that used a large and imbalanced dataset in their training and testing phases, we realized that ensemble methods (bagging or boosting) are the best fit. They resulted in detection rates as high as 99% and error rates of less than 1%. DMOZ and Phishtank are the main datasets used in these systems as well as the author collected datasets. This can be seen as evidence that researchers should focus more on ensemble methods [156] .
Using relatively diverse dataset can make the model more robust and general. There are several works that used Alexa as their source for legitimate websites. Although Alexa's list of top websites is diverse in term of having different categories of websites, it only contains domain names. So, there is a clear distinction between legitimate and phishing websites. One way to remove this bias is to use Alexa's list as a basis for crawling [91] and use crawled websites as a dataset.
VIII. PHISHING/SPEAR PHISHING EMAIL DETECTION
Email is a popular vector of phishing and spear phishing attacks. Thus, detection of these attacks is critical. In this section, we review 37 phishing and eight spear phishing email detection papers.
A. Email Structure
An email consists of two main parts: Header fields (abbr. Header), and a Body, which is optional. 16 Simple Mail Transfer Protocol or SMTP 17 is the Application layer protocol used in sending and receiving emails. Originally, emails were only able to handle plain text messages. Multi-Purpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) 18 supported new file types like JPEG and HTML.
The Header is a sequence of lines that are composed of a field name, followed by a colon (":"), then some information, and ends with a newline (Example VIII.1). Though mostly hidden from the reader, the header is very important since it contains sender's and recipients' information, an optional message-ID field, and the route (hops and SMTP relays) taken by the email. Authentication-results is an important header field for spam and phishing detection and displays the results of authentication protocols such as Sender Policy Framework (SPF). SPF is an open standard specifying a method to prevent sender address forgery. 19 Another widely used protocol is DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) for email integrity. 20 The email body is optional and usually contains greetings, the actual message, and a possible signature field. It also includes images and other types of attachments. The MIME extension enabled the body to be coded with non-textual elements like HTML or Base64. An email body formatted with MIME content has a MIME-Version field in the header.
The header and body are the main parts for extracting features from an email, so we refer to them as Header and Body Features respectively. We describe the different types of features used in email detection research in the next section. We present the other types of features (External and Attachment related) and the papers that use them respectively in Appendix Table A12 .
B. Feature Extraction and Analysis
Header Features: The research literature focuses on sender related fields -e.g., From, Sender, Mail From, Reply-to, etc.,especially the Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) in these fields and verifying their consistency throughout the header. The FQDN is the complete domain name for a specific host on the Internet. 21 It is made of the hostname and domain name. In the following example: "mymail.somecollege.edu", the hostname is mymail, and the domain is somecollege.edu.
To illustrate, an email supposedly from Amazon should not have a Reply-to entry with an Outlook domain name. However, it is possible for the sender to spoof all the header fields pertaining to sender domain and email address. The Subject is commonly analyzed (Table A12) , it being an important lure used by phishers. So researchers use different types of lexical analysis relying on Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques to extract features and search for blacklisted words. Another interesting field is the Received field. It allows emails to be tracked down because every hop the emails passes through will register its own entry (specifying the domains of the sending and receiving hosts, timestamp, etc.) [157] . An email received from a coworker in the same building using the company's mailing server should not be coming from a host in another country.
Body Features: Researchers use lexical analysis to detect common phrasing patterns or words, e.g., Click here, Urgent, Warning, Account closure notice, etc. NLP techniques [158] were used to design: 1) Semantic features, e.g., detecting language that elicits urgency or threat [159] . 2) Stylometric features, e.g., detecting writing habits and profiling users [160] , [161] . Researchers also extract important features from URLs included in the email body (as covered in Section VI).
In Table XV , we list the various features that appeared in phishing email detection research papers, as well as their size and required processing time. URL features have longer extraction times (as seen in Section VI-B) compared to "shallow" lexical features (e.g., word frequencies) extracted from the body. The size of most email features is relatively small, except for features that rely on the vocabulary of the whole dataset like TFIDF [27] . Weighing the features with algorithms like Information Gain (IG) makes it possible to get subsets of features that give better classification results [162] [163] [164] [165] [166] [167] [168] . Figure 13 shows the classification and clustering methods used in the phishing email detection literature and the number of papers that employed them. It shows a preference for Support Vector Machine (SVM) and Random Forest (RF). The number of research papers using supervised algorithms is higher than the number using unsupervised algorithms. More details and information about the methods used by each paper can be found in Table A6 in the Appendix. As previously mentioned, the lack of diverse and new datasets gives a false impression or interpretation of supervised classifiers' results. Some researchers have tackled the lack of labeled datasets by using unsupervised algorithms to cluster or create profiles of users' writing habits [160] , [161] .
C. Detection Methods
D. Dataset Properties 1) Dataset Sources and Availability:
We describe the different dataset sources used in phishing email detection literature in Table XVI . Figures 14 and 15 show the distribution of these sources. It is clear that the most popular datasets for phishing and legitimate emails are Nazario 22 and SpamAssassin 23 respectively. We also include sources for malware, spam, and spear phishing datasets in Table XVI .
Researchers need to be aware that publicly available datasets can be sanitized. For example, the Enron dataset 24 and the SpamAssassin dataset have some obfuscated addresses and domains. Moreover, many of the emails in the Enron dataset only have partial headers (missing a number of fields) instead of full headers.
An increasing number of authors used their own private datasets or worked with companies to get their email logs and archives. It has the benefit of training and testing models on realistic and relatively new emails. However, it raises the 22 issue of reproducibility and comparisons of systems. Although the objective is to release a new system with a high detection rate, it would also help the field of research if authors share new datasets. That being said, we are aware of issues related to sensitive information and realize that sharing can be difficult.
2) Dataset Size and Class Ratio: As mentioned above, the ratio of benign to malicious samples in phishing detection is very important. Therefore, we report the number of the papers that used different combinations of dataset sizes in Table XVII . It also shows the sizes of the phishing and legitimate dataset sizes that are commonly used together. We notice from this table that most authors use relatively balanced ratios (e.g., 2:3 or 4.5:5.5). Examples of research in the literature that used imbalanced datasets with different ratios are [158] , [162] , [164] , [166] , [172] .
3) Dataset Diversity:
Another concern is the dataset diversity. Therefore, we analyze the email body content diversity of the most used datasets: SpamAssassin, Enron, and Nazario. With this aim, we extract all the text from the email body then we remove all the HTML tags, CSS, and header of the emails. We also filter out all stop words to remove uninformative words. Then we convert the extracted text into vectors using TFIDF representation. The SpamAssassin dataset includes both spam and ham emails. The Inverse Document Frequency was computed using all the emails. After getting the vectors, we use Cosine Similarity (Equation (9)) to measure the similarities. The dataset sizes were 10,745 for SpamAssassin, 156,070 for Enron (Sent folder), and 8,551 for Nazario. Table XVIII shows the percentage of email pairs in each dataset with a specific range of similarities It shows that the datasets have diverse email body content: 90.91% of email Fig. 13 . Algorithms used in phishing email detection. The number of papers using the method is in parentheses. pairs in Nazario dataset and more than 97% in SpamAssassin and Enron datasets have less than 10% similarity. 4) Recency of Data Collection: Nazario, SpamAssassin, Enron, and UCI datasets are made of old emails (early 2000s), except for Nazario who released new emails annually from 2015-17. This could explain why some authors prefer to rely on private sources, e.g., personal emails or companies' datasets. Table XIX describes the recency of the datasets in relation to the papers' publication dates. From the table, we conclude that almost 70% of the papers used old datasets. Thus, we recommend using recent sources of emails if possible. For example, the Wikileaks website holds archives with thousands of recent legitimate emails from varied sources, e.g., Clinton emails, Hacking Team, Sony, etc. An interesting source for phishing emails are Phishbowls, which are a frequently updated collection of emails with full or partial header maintained by universities, e.g., Cornell IT Phishbowl. 25 We refer to [88] where the authors built a dataset with emails from Wikileaks archives and Phishbowls from different universities.
TABLE XVI LEGITIMATE AND PHISHING EMAIL DATASETS: Sources and Availability
E. Evaluation Metrics
We list in Table XX the metrics and the number of papers that used up to two of these metrics in their evaluations. Information about papers that cover more than two metrics can be found in Table A3 in the Appendix. We note that 7 papers out of 37 did not mention the metrics they used. A total of 12 papers reported a combination of more than two metrics for evaluation. The most common evaluation metrics used in the phishing email detection literature are Accuracy (Acc), and the confusion matrix (CMx). As mentioned before, Precision, Recall, and F 1 -score (PRF) and Accuracy are unsuitable for evaluating imbalanced datasets. Hence we recommend the use of metrics like AUC and the confusion matrix values instead.
In the surveyed phishing email detection literature, only one paper used G-mean [185] , 13 reported the confusion matrix, and seven reported AUC. 25 https://it.cornell.edu/phish-bowl 
F. Selected Email Detection Literature
We now take a deeper look at the phishing email detection literature that addressed at least some of the security challenges mentioned in Section V-A. Then we summarize the lessons learned and recommend some good practices.
In a realistic phishing scenario, the number of phishing emails is considerably lower than legitimate ones. Therefore, the base-rate fallacy is a critical issue that needs to be considered. We notice that researchers stopped using a 1:1 ratio. However, the ratios used are still not realistic. We cite for example [164] , where the authors used a dataset made of 4,150 legitimate and 2,687 phishing emails from SpamAssassin and Nazario respectively. Reference [163] relied on the same sources but used different ratios: 1,700 ham and 1,000 phishing emails. An instance of a realistic ratio is [172] , where the authors collected 36,364 ham emails and 3,636 phishing emails from private sources.
The lack of new datasets is an important security challenge. As we concluded previously from Table XIX , researchers still employ old data. If we consider the evolution of phishing attacks, then using emails from old sources to train and evaluate classifiers is a problem. Authors who work with companies use their private email logs collected from recent months or years for their research. An example of such papers is [190] where the authors gathered 2,048 phishing emails from an Australian bank in the span of 5 months. Another example would be [165] where the authors collected from their own private server 2,000 legitimate and 300 phishing emails in the same year the paper was published. We also cite [181] where the authors collected 1,492 (986 legitimate 506 phishing) emails in the span of 3 months, almost a year before the paper was published. However, the use of private datasets exacerbates the problem of comparing systems.
Testing the robustness of the phishing email detection system is a good prevention mechanism against the active attacker. Researchers test for robustness in different ways. One way would be to train the phishing email detector on one subset of the dataset, but test it on another subset that was collected in a later time span, e.g., [172] . The overall performance of the system proposed in [172] was a bit lower but they still achieved an F 1 -score of 98.66% compared to the original F 1 -score of 99.89%. The same authors also added 20,000 emails to their dataset and considered spam and phishing as an unwanted class, and then tested an unchanged model. They achieve an F 1 -score of 99.48%. Another way to test for robustness and how the classifier would perform against zeroday attacks is to train the model on one dataset and test it on emails from a different dataset. This was done, for example, in [165] . The authors trained their classifiers on Nazario and SpamAssassin datasets, then tested on emails collected from their private servers. The performance only dropped by almost 1% from 99% to 98%. Legitimate datasets were varied in [158] . They trained only on a subset of inbox emails from Enron and then tested on a different subset of inbox emails as well as a subset of sent emails from Enron. A few papers also leverage semantics to increase the robustness of the features and increase the performance of classifiers. The following papers [158] , [159] , [168] , [180] , [189] reported the use of WordNet 26 to enrich the textual features. Wordnet is a large lexical dataset for English and is used to identify the semantic relationships of the tokens used as features.
An issue that we encountered in the reviewed literature was the ability to perform a comparative analysis of systems. Indeed, few researchers report the training and testing times of their models and/or the details of the machines used to run those models. Exceptions include [165] , [172] , [177] .
In the next subsection, we focus on the research done in spear phishing detection. The readers will notice that it is shorter compared to email detection. The reason is the paucity of research on this topic.
G. Spear Phishing
Spear phishing emails are malicious emails that are targeted towards an individual, or a specific group of people, or a specific organization. It is called targeted because it contains information sensitive to the intended victim. Hackers use spear phishing attacks not only to steal money or personal information but also to install malware or obtain credentials of an account with higher privileges. 27 Research covering spear phishing emails is still small compared to research on phishing emails, URLs, and websites. Based on the attributes mentioned in Section V-A, we analyzed eight papers. Here, we highlight the spear phishing email literature that addressed at least some of the security challenges mentioned in Section IV.
The base-rate fallacy is an even more serious issue for spear phishing emails since they are scarce compared to even normal phishing emails. An example of research that used an imbalanced dataset is Han and Shen [170] . The emails were collected from Symantec's enterprise email scanning services and contained 1,467 spear phishing emails from eight different known campaigns and 14,043 benign emails collected between 2011 and 2013. Another example is Stringhini and Thonnard [160] , where they used the Enron Corpus and three email datasets from a large security company (that were not detected by spam-filtering software) to collect and work on 43,274 spam, 17,473 phishing, and 546 spear phishing emails. The last example is Ho et al. [195] . The authors worked on a dataset from Lawrence Berkeley National Lab (LBNL), which consisted of 372 million emails and event logs gathered since 2013. The security team of LNBL and the method developed by the researchers only discovered 21 spear phishing emails combined. This is an example of a realistic ratio of benign to spear phishing emails.
The time-scale of spear phishing attacks are short, thus the need for real-time detection systems. Ho et al. [195] exploited domain and sender reputation features and created a new anomaly detection technique. Their method scores a click-in-email event by generating the feature vector and comparing it with previous events using a time window (e.g., three or six months). Their method was able to detect 17 out of 19 spear phishing campaigns in addition to two others that were previously undetected by LBNL. Another live detection system was made by Stringhini and Thonnard [160] . They built a system that is based on senders' writing habits. User profiles were built using writing habits (occurrence of characters, functional and special words, style metrics, etc.), composition and sending habits and interaction habits (social network of the user). After the system is trained using SVM with SMO (Sequential Minimal Optimization), it launches an identity-verification process when a received email is considered suspicious. Han and Shen [170] attempt to improve upon the time-consuming task of manually analyzing datasets of emails to detect which are spear phishing. They used a graph-based semi-supervised learning framework to differentiate between benign, known and unknown spear phishing campaigns. The dataset contained sets of labeled spear phishing campaigns and unlabeled emails. They achieved a 0.9 F 1 -score with a 0.01 false positive rate in detecting spear phishing emails that belong to previously known campaigns. However, F 1 -score may not be the best metric to use for imbalanced datasets. We encourage authors to evaluate their system using the metrics suggested in Section VIII-E.
We summarize next the lessons learned from reviewing the phishing and spear phishing email detection literature.
H. Lessons Learned and Best Practices
There is still much to be done to enhance the research practices in the phishing and spear phishing email detection fields. Researchers should give more attention to the reproducibility of their work by specifying: the architecture of the machines that run the training and testing models; the training and testing times; and sharing the datasets used or possible ways to collect them (if not available already). Research using balanced datasets is decreasing. However, the ratios of legitimate to phishing emails used in the literature are still not realistic. Researchers can start by using data with skewed ratios between legitimate and malicious classes and evaluate their systems using metrics made for imbalanced datasets. To detect zero-day attacks and reinforce detection systems against active attackers, more research is needed on periodic retraining using new datasets and on real-time detection mechanisms.
IX. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
A careful review of the literature on phishing URL, website and email detection from the security challenges perspective reveals multiple opportunities for future contribution, which are discussed below.
• Dataset Issues: We observe a lack of good dataset sources and a dearth of diversity in the data used for evaluation of detection systems. PhishTank and APWG are popular sources of phishing URLs used in URL and website detection; DMOZ (now deprecated) and Alexa's list of top websites are common sources of legitimate links. However, Alexa only provides legitimate domain names, which do not capture the true nature and variety of complete URLs that a user can come across in a real-world scenario. Only a few authors go the extra mile to include a detailed description of how the data was collected [197] . Along with its diversity, recency of the data must also be taken into account during evaluation. Newer types of phishing URLs are submitted to crowd-sourced sites like APWG, PhishTank. But the use of deprecated sources such as DMOZ, Yahoo Directory, etc., renders the proposed system useless to newer attacks. In email detection, we notice a clear affinity towards using old data sources like Nazario, SpamAssassin, and/or Enron. [26] , balanced detection rate [88] , etc. Using appropriate metrics for evaluating performance on imbalanced datasets can also tackle the base-rate fallacy issue. • Retraining the Systems: System retraining is important for adapting detection models based on machine learning methods against an active attacker. However, much of the relevant literature does not mention the retraining of classification models trained on features extracted from older websites, URLs, and/or emails (malicious and benign). This is a major concern since the pre-trained detection models are most likely to fail when phishers change the type and nature of the malicious websites/URLs and URLs embedded in emails, thus changing the attributes that the classifier depends upon for its judgment. We refer readers to papers, e.g., [28] , [92] , [138] , which describe techniques/periodicity for retraining. • Generalization Experiment: Common techniques for training and testing the data involve five-fold or ten-fold cross-validation or in some cases, splitting the original dataset into training (usually 70%-60%) and testing (usually 30%-40%) data. But in such cases, the source of the data remains the same and the test set may have attributes which are common to the training set -thus ensuring better performance of the classifier. This, however, may not be the case in a real-world scenario. Therefore a proposed methodology should be cross-evaluated (trained on one dataset and tested on a different dataset) on attack types from a varied range of data sources. Deploying a system in a real-world setup (as part of a mail server, or web browser) also tests the system's performance against newer attacks. • Supervised Machine Learning: We observed an important gap in the detection techniques employed for malicious URLs, websites and emails: a majority of the implementations use supervised learning methods. The major necessity for training and evaluating the performance of such supervised systems is the considerable amount of labeled data. However, this brings us back to a major security challenge -data availability. • Evaluation Times: Phishing attacks are usually launched for a short window of time (a few days or weeks). Therefore, for the detection of malicious websites, the mechanism used should be fast as well as capable of zero-day attack detection. However, only a few papers (e.g., [22] ) report run times for training the classifiers. In our opinion, training and detection times should be emphasized while discussing the performance of a classifier.
X. THE WEAKEST LINK -USER STUDIES
Regardless of detectors' performance, users play an important role in preventing attacks, since determined attackers can find ways to bypass detection techniques. Till date, users are considered the most vulnerable link in the phishing ecosystem. According to a study by Intel, 97% of people are not able to detect phishing emails. 28 There are several studies on users' susceptibility to phishing attacks, e.g., [198] , [199] , and on how to improve their knowledge about them, e.g., [200] , [201] . We then systematically review the following attributes of 63 selected studies.
• Participants and Environment: The number of participants recruited in the study and whether they were recruited from a specific population (e.g., university students). Running the experiment in the lab usually forces the researchers to reduce the number of participants, so we also consider the environment of the study as an attribute (Lab/Real). Researchers can ask participants to come to the lab to do the experiment (Lab) or send them an email (or link to an online survey) so they can do the experiment wherever they want (Real).
• Evaluation: The variables that were measured in the study: detection rate, background knowledge, personality, and cognitive process. Personality is used to distinguish qualities or characteristics of individuals. It consists of five major traits: Openness, Conscientiousness, Extraversion, Agreeableness, and Neuroticism [202] .
Cognitive process refers to four variables related to humans' decision making process: 1) neural activity: to measure individuals effort in detecting phishing attacks, 2) eye movement: to find parts of the email/website that people focus on, 3) cognitive impulsivity [203] : Tendency to act without much thought, and 4) heuristic/systematic processing [204] : Explains how people receive and process a message, either by using their background knowledge or by investigating and analyzing the message. Besides these quantitative measures, qualitative analysis of participants' reasoning can be used to understand their thought processes and performance. • Context: Whether the study is about phishing webpages or phishing emails. • Experiment Design: Important aspects of the experiment design. It includes: whether the experiment involves deception (i.e., participants are not informed that the experiment is about phishing) and whether participants' behavior changes with time (long-term study). Design of the questionnaire is also important, some studies only ask participants about their vulnerabilities (Q & A) while more complex studies show the participants phishing/legitimate emails or webpages (experimental). • Goal of the Study: We found two different goals for user studies on phishing attacks. 1) Detection: studying the quantitative and qualitative performance of participants on detecting different types of attacks. 2) Training: studying the effectiveness of a training method. Although most training studies are followed by a detection study, we make a distinction between the pure detection studies and training studies. Categorizing the previous research into different groups based on the aforementioned attributes helps us identify the areas that are well studied and also the gaps in existing research. After reviewing the studies based on the aforementioned attributes, we point out their strengths and weaknesses and conclude with a discussion on the gaps in existing research and some possible future directions. Table XXI shows the number and type of participants along with the environment of each study. We categorized the participants into three groups: students, employees of a company, and unrestricted population (i.e., participants sampled from a general population). Empty cells in the table show the areas that remain unexplored. Although there are lots of arguments in the literature about the lab versus real world experiment [205] [206] [207] , based on Table XXI, it is clear that both types of experiments are popular among researchers. Researchers can ask participants to come to the lab to do the experiment (Lab) or send them the emails (or link to an online survey) so they can do the experiment wherever they want (Real). No study on employees has been conducted in the lab environment. Although the real world experiment is more general in comparison to the lab experiment, the lab experiment helps the researcher analyze human behavior in more detail and understand the factors that affect their responses.
A. Participants and Environment
Apart from the type and number of participants, the variables that are being studied play an important role on the quality of the experiment. While on one hand, studying several variables helps to look at different aspects at the same time; on the other, it makes the experiment more complicated and probably requires more participants. In the next section we discuss variables that have been studied in the reviewed literature.
B. Experimental Attributes
Table XXII groups the literature based on the context, evaluation, and whether or not deception was involved in the studies. Based on the table, it is obvious that there is more research on emails than webpages. Another observation is the lack of a long-term study. People's behavior can change over time, so it is important to redo the experiment after a long period of time to see how their behavior changes. We also mentioned the variables that each work studied in Table XXII . Although there are a few works that study several attributes together, most of the existing works study the effect a single variable (e.g., personality) on participants' phishing detection ability.
Multiple Comparisons Problem: We noticed that several papers, e.g., [214] , [216] , [220] , [222] [223] [224] , [230] [231] [232] , [236] , [239] , [240] , [244] , [245] , [247] , [261] , made their statistically significant conclusion by running multiple tests on a single dependent variable. Multiple comparisons problem [265] . Armstrong [266] is the simplest way to adjust the p-value, which is too conservative in rejecting the null hypothesis (increases type 2 error). More complex methods like Benjamini and Hochberg [267] can be used to lower type 1 and 2 errors simultaneously (compared to Bonferroni). In the next section, we give a brief summary of the works selected based on how thoroughly they covered the aforementioned attributes, involving emails or websites (some with deception and some without).
C. Selected User Study Literature
Studies on users' behaviour are not completely aligned with the challenges we described in Section IV. Therefore, instead of selecting the papers based on those challenges, we evaluate the literature based on the following: 1) how many different variables were studied; 2) context (email or website); 3) environment; and 4) whether or not it includes deception.
Researchers in [199] studied the effect of psychological traits on people's ability to detect email phishing attacks and online information sharing. They sent a "prize scam" email to 100 students from a psychology class that requested an immediate response. They also asked about the privacy settings of participants on Facebook, the frequency of posting, type of data they posted, etc. The results show that for women, certain personality traits (neuroticism and openness) are more likely to be associated with vulnerability to phishing attacks as well as with online information sharing on a social network.
The effect of priming people on detection of phishing emails has been studied in [217] . They divided a total of 117 participants into two groups. One group was not informed that they are participants in a phishing study, but the other group was informed. As expected, their results indicate, that informed participants perform better than not-informed participants. Also, they found that background knowledge in computers improves participants' phishing detection rate.
A few studies investigated the relationship of brain activity with phishing and other security-related tasks. Researchers in [208] and [211] used Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) and Electroencephalogram (EEG) to measure brain's electrical activity and an eye-tracker to have a better understanding of users' decision-making process. They used both existing phishing websites (by downloading and hosting them on their own network) and manually created ones. The EEG results show that at a subconscious level, there might be hidden differences in how users detect real and fake websites. The fMRI results show an increase in brain activity (on regions related to decision-making, attention and problem solving) during the detection task. Although participants tried to process the existing information to differentiate between real and fake webpages, their performance still low. This suggests that people may not have enough knowledge about the cues that really need their attention. The eye-gaze pattern captured by the eye-tracker revealed that participants did not pay enough attention to the cues that show whether a webpage is real or fake ("less time on URL; more time on login field or website logo").
Training is one of the techniques to help people avoid phishing attacks. Attackers may choose a domain name very similar to the domain name of the target company, e.g., bank0famerica.com (using '0' instead of the letter 'o'). So, can we say that paying attention to the URL will help detect some of the phishing websites? To answer this question, researchers did a study on the effectiveness of highlighting the domain in helping people detect phishing webpages [201] . A group of 22 people were showed 16 webpages (8 legitimate and 8 fraudulent) and asked how safe these websites are. Then they asked participants to re-evaluate the same 16 webpages by focusing on the address bar. They categorized the participants into three types based on which clues they observed: A) those who pay attention to the content of the webpage, B) those who pay attention to the information found in the address bar and AB) those who rely primarily on the content and sometimes use the address bar information. Their results show that the A similar study has been done on a larger scale (320 participants), which resulted in a similar conclusion [210] .
So far, we only discussed user studies on regular phishing attacks. Training people to detect spear phishing attacks is also important, since these attacks are harder to detect automatically due to their targeted nature, thus we review them in the next section.
D. Spear Phishing
Despite the importance of spear phishing attacks, we found only two user studies on this type of attack [10] , [250] . In both works, spear phishing emails were sent to the employees of a company. The goal in [10] is to study the effect of training on employees (1369 employees), while the goal of [250] is to study the employees' (40 employees) vulnerability to spear phishing attack. It has been shown in [10] that immediate feedback is not enough for increasing people's awareness. They sent a series of carefully crafted spear phishing emails to the employees and gave them immediate training whenever they fell for an attack. The study in [250] found that there is a correlation between users' conscientiousness and their responses to the spear phishing. Another interesting finding is the negative correlation between participants' subjective estimate of their own vulnerability and the likelihood of being phished.
We conclude this section by reviewing the unexplored areas in the existing research and some suggestion for future works.
E. Opportunities for Future Research
Based on Table XXI , the important missing studies are: a deep analysis of participants' reasoning on (1) real-world studies with unrestricted participants and (2) in-lab experiments with employees. There is typically an inverse relationship between the depth of behavioral analysis and the number of participants. The fewer the participants, the better researchers can analyze the responses of each participant individually. An employee-only study is also important because many of the spear phishing studies use employees of a company as their target.
Another missing study is a comparison between conducting the same experiment in the lab or in a real-world situation. There is only one study in which the experiment was conducted in both real and lab environment [214] . Researchers first ran the experiment in the lab to have more control, and then, to increase confidence and power (by increasing the number of participants), they did the experiment in a real scenario. Although they showed that results from real and lab environment are similar, their goal was not to compare these two environments. Also, there is only one study that considers long-term effects (Table XXII) in their experiment design [230] . They re-tested the participants (primary school students) after two and four weeks of conducting a phishing training (interactive presentation). Surprisingly, their results showed that after a gap of four weeks, the performance of the participants diminished to the level before the training had occurred. The main limitation of their work is that they used a paper-based questionnaire to record participants performance instead of showing them the email/webpage on the computer. More studies with diverse populations are needed to make a general conclusion about the temporal effect on people's performance.
As we mentioned, only two groups studied users' behaviour on spear phishing attacks. More studies are required to understand the different aspects of spear phishing attacks as well as how people respond to them. Then training techniques can be developed based on the results of these studies to increase people's awareness about the risk of spear phishing attacks.
XI. RELATED WORK
Phishing has been the topic of several surveys as well as books. We organize the related work along the major themes: emails, websites, URLs, user studies, and general surveys. The last category includes those surveys that examine more than one dimension of phishing detection. We conclude this section by mentioning surveys on two related areas: spam detection and web page classification. We summarize our observations about the phishing surveys in Table XXIII .
Emails: There is one survey that focuses primarily on phishing email literature [268] . In this 2013 survey, the researchers review mostly on machine-learning techniques for email filtering, and their relative advantages and disadvantages. They also classify the approaches proposed in the literature according to different stages of the attack flow as: network level protection, authentication, client side tool, user education, and server side filters and classifiers. We discuss other email surveys under General surveys.
URLs: Recently a survey on phishing URL detection has become available [31] . In this survey, features for phishing URL detection are covered, and different kinds of machine learning techniques are surveyed: batch, on-line, representation, etc. Also, [269] , [270] survey a few papers on phishing URL detection, and [9] , [11] , [271] discuss some of the issues and literature associated with phishing URL detection.
Websites: Three teams of researchers have surveyed phishing website detection [32] , [272] , [273] . In [272] , did a novel study of phishing website detection papers along five dimensions: blacklist/whitelist, instantaneous protection, decision support tools, community rating tools such as Web of Trust, and intelligent heuristics. Subsequently, Varshney et al. [273] added search-based, visual-similarity, DNS-based, and proactive phishing URL based detection techniques. They also discussed pros and cons for each type of detection technique and some selected papers, for which they summarized results and dataset sizes. In [32] , three criteria were used to select papers for discussion (novelty, attention -measured by a number of citations, and completeness). In a more recent study of phishing techniques [274] , the authors give a detailed description of how content-based methods have been used for phishing detection in previous literature. The researchers provide a brief history of phishing along with an analysis of automatic detection methods and how they help fight phishing website attacks.
User Studies: To the best of our knowledge, there is no comprehensive survey of user studies of phishing or spear phishing, although some surveys, e.g., [9] , [11] , [271] , [275] , discuss it as part of their taxonomy, training, or study of selected solutions. In [276] , the authors survey a few papers on user studies.
General Surveys: In a 2012 survey, the author surveyed a range of countermeasures for phishing, ranging from email detection to training and legal studies [275] . In a 2013 survey, [276] , researchers examined 20 proposed solutions in detail. These included both software detection techniques as well as some training approaches for human awareness and vulnerability. In [9] , researchers have given: a nice taxonomy of phishing attacks and defenses, identified features for phishing email detection, and compared 15 phishing email detection techniques and 15 phishing website detection techniques over the period 2000-2016. In [11] , some dataset sources are listed, taxonomies are discussed with more examples, features for phishing email detection are listed and 18 solutions are discussed over the period 2000-2016.
In a 2017 phishing survey [271] , researchers have proposed a new, multi-dimensional phishing taxonomy and classified phishing countermeasures in five categories: machine learning, text mining, human users, profile matching, and others, with the last category further subdivided into: search engines, ontology, client-server authentication, and honeypot countermeasures. They compare anti-phishing tools, both commercial and research prototypes, and identify gaps in literature in terms of unstudied or little-studied attack vectors and communication channels. A 2018 survey [19] on phishing reviews popular techniques and vectors or channels for phishing operations. It presents in detail several techniques and propagation methods for social engineering attacks. The paper additionally evaluates how such existing methods can be combined to launch more sophisticated attacks in future.
Two related areas worth mentioning are spam detection and Web page classification. Although the goals of spam and phishing are different, and phishing detection is more challenging because of deception, there are similarities in the approaches, algorithms, and features that have been employed. We refer the reader to the survey of spam detection for more details [277] . By comparing the work on spam detection and on phishing detection, we observe that phishing work has not utilized text mining and natural language processing techniques as much as spam detection. Web page classification also exploits text classification techniques. We refer to [278] for an excellent survey on Web page classification.
No previous work, to our knowledge, has attempted to systematize and evaluate the phishing literature from the perspective of security challenges or dataset diversity, and we did not find any previous survey of spear phishing research literature.
XII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have covered phishing and spear phishing detection techniques and user studies from the perspective of security challenges. To our knowledge, this is the first systematic survey of these important topics from this viewpoint, and the only comprehensive survey of spear phishing research and user studies of phishing/spear phishing. We identified several opportunities for future research. Specifically, we found that deep learning techniques have not been exploited much in phishing detection. A large number of papers use a wide variety of features, but do not include any information about feature importance or feature selection -this is important since using many features can slowdown system performance. Other gaps include: the lack of proper datasets 29 and metrics for evaluation, and lack of diverse population in user studies and long-term experiments. Our systematization reviews and outlines the common security challenges prevalent in cybersecurity, which can be utilized for the evaluation of future research on these topics and may lead to improved and more practical schemes.
APPENDIX
In the Appendix, we give tables with bibliographic numbers of the papers, so that interested readers can easily find the original sources for each entry in our tables in the main part of the paper. 
